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Waco Tragedy Product of Groupthink 
 
Aubrey Immelman 
Department of Psychology 
St. John’s University / College of St. Benedict 
May 1993 
 
The fiery end to the 51-day Ranch Apocalypse standoff in Waco sent shock waves across the 
nation and around the world. In serious analysis of the tragedy, as in federal spin control, one 
explanation was curiously absent: groupthink. 
 
Social psychologist Irving L. Janis, in his book Groupthink (Houghton Mifflin, 1982), uses the 
term to refer to a mode of thinking where group members’ “strivings for unanimity override their 
motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action. ... [resulting in] a deterioration of 
mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment.” According to Janis, a number of “historic 
fiascoes” may be attributed to groupthink, including the failure to protect Pearl Harbor against 
Japanese attack, the Bay of Pigs invasion, the escalation of the Vietnam War, and the Watergate 
cover-up. 
 
Though initial assessment in the aftermath of the Waco debacle strongly implicates the 
presence of groupthink, it should be borne in mind that criticism of the Justice Department’s 
decision-making procedures no more absolves David Koresh of blame than U.S. negligence 
pardons the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. 
 
The diagnosis of groupthink hinges on several symptoms. Let’s examine the available 
evidence: 
 
Illusion of invulnerability.  This symptom is characterized by an unrealistic sense of 
confidence, encouraging group members to take extreme risks. A reliable sign of this shared 
illusion is the failure to work out contingency plans. According to Attorney General Janet Reno, 
her worst-case scenario before the assault was an explosion. So, where was the firefighting 
equipment when the blaze erupted? 
 
Belief in the inherent morality of the group. In groupthink, group members are inclined to 
ignore the moral and ethical consequences of their decisions. Statements by spokespeople for the 
FBI, the Justice Department, and the Clinton administration immediately following the fiasco were 
characterized by a seeming insensitivity to the moral question of subjecting children to potentially 
lethal CS gas as a means of ending alleged child abuse. 
 
Collective efforts to rationalize. Victims of groupthink typically discount warnings that may 
induce them to reconsider their assumptions. In view of the fact that the planners’ worst-case 
scenario was an explosion, how did they rationalize the decision to ram combat engineering 
vehicles into a relatively fragile frame building containing highly flammable substances and 
ammunition? In addition, the FBI’s argument that the elite Hostage Rescue Team was “fatigued” 
after only 51 days is particularly unconvincing. When decision makers rationalize their chosen 
course of action, an inevitable casualty is the evaluation of alternatives. The use of child abuse 
 2
allegations as a pretext for the FBI assault is a clear example. Wasn’t the original warrant issued 
to investigate firearm violations? Moreover, did the Attorney General forget that the investigation 
of child abuse is not under federal jurisdiction? 
 
Stereotyped views of the adversary. It appears that the FBI plan to terminate negotiations was 
based in part on expert advice that Koresh’s statements were “the ramblings of a diseased mind” 
and “one-sided delusional tirades” of a “paranoic.” This dehumanization is also evident in Janet 
Reno’s testimony on April 28 during a congressional hearing: “You were dealing with a madman, 
Congressman — he was totally unpredictable.” These diabolical-enemy images in the Justice 
Department played a key role in making Koresh’s apocalyptic predictions a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. 
 
Self-censorship and illusion of unanimity. It is symptomatic of groupthink that members who 
deviate from the apparent group consensus fail to express their reservations, contributing to a 
shared illusion of unanimity. It may thus be expected that formerly unexpressed misgivings about 
the abortive scheme will emerge if those involved in the decision are intensively questioned during 
subsequent investigations. 
 
Direct pressure. In groupthink, dissenting group members are invariably subjected to strong 
conformity pressure. The question is this: What, if any, pressure did the FBI exert on Janet Reno 
to approve their ill-fated plan? 
 
Mindguards. The emergence of “mindguards” — self-appointed gatekeepers who “protect” 
the decision-making group from information that may disturb members’ complacency about the 
correctness and morality of their course of action — is symptomatic of groupthink. It is significant 
that FBI Deputy Director Floyd Clarke and Assistant Director Larry Potts were briefed in Waco 
as early as April 7 and 8 by Special Agent in Charge Jeff Jamar about his plan to use armored 
vehicles to infuse the Branch Davidian compound with tear gas. This places a serious question 
mark over the earnestness with which alternatives were examined during the period immediately 
preceding the April 19 assault on the compound. It is reported that the plan was presented to Janet 
Reno on April 12, and that on April 14 she widened the task force, calling in additional Justice 
Department and FBI officials and representatives of Delta Force, the army’s crack rescue team. 
Delta Force commanders were reportedly “scornful” of the plan, yet the Pentagon maintains they 
merely attended the briefing and were not asked for an evaluation. Why this apparent suppression 
of information? 
 
Finally, perhaps the most telling manifestation of the mental paralysis produced by groupthink 
occurred when the Attorney General, several hours after the fiery holocaust, explained that the 
FBI was forced to act because “nobody could tell what he [Koresh] might do.” Begging the 
question, she continued: “Anybody that has done what he did today — this stark and horrible 
tragedy — could do anything.” 
 
Such is the unreasoning beast that is groupthink. 
 
Note. This article was originally published as “Waco tragedy product of ‘groupthink’ in the 
St. Cloud Times, May 9, 1993, p. 8A. 
